-By LeN Geopolitical Correspondent
(Lanka-e-News -22.Nov.2025, 11.00 PM) When Sri Lankan citizens queue for months, often years, for a visa appointment at the United States Embassy in Colombo, many leave feeling like second-class applicants—interviewed briefly, rejected briskly, and treated with a degree of suspicion not befitting nationals of a long-time partner in the Indian Ocean. Yet, as fate and geopolitics would have it, Washington’s gaze has now swung decisively toward a treasure lying beneath the very waters that surround these frustrated travellers: Sri Lanka’s cobalt-rich undersea territory.
The sudden strategic warmth—complete with high-level US technical teams flying into Colombo, new defence agreements, and public statements about “deepening maritime cooperation”—has raised a blunt question in political circles: Should the United States treat Sri Lankans with dignity before dispatching its experts to explore the island’s mineral deposits?
Over the past month, Washington has quietly accelerated its scientific and defence footprint in Sri Lanka. A team from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), working alongside specialists from the US Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command (NMOC), arrived to launch what officials described as a “hydrographic mapping enhancement project.” The objective, they claim, is to help Sri Lanka map its waters, improve shipping safety, and bolster maritime domain awareness.
But in Colombo’s strategic community—and among more sceptical members of the cabinet—there is a broader recognition: hydrographic mapping in 2025 is rarely just about shipping lanes. Not when the work is being led by the same agencies that support US naval operations, and not when those mapping exercises take place near one of the Indian Ocean’s least explored mineral vaults: the Afanasy Nikitin Seamount.
The Afanasy Nikitin Seamount—a towering 400-kilometre-long and 150-kilometre-wide undersea ridge located south of Sri Lanka—has re-entered international conversation for a simple reason: cobalt.
Cobalt, the core ingredient used in electric vehicle batteries, advanced submarines, missile systems, jet engines, space technologies, and AI-era electronics, is now as geopolitically valuable as oil was in the 20th century. Global demand is expected to triple by 2035, with supply risk soaring due to overdependence on the Democratic Republic of Congo, where instability and human-rights concerns plague mining operations.
The Afanasy Nikitin plateau rises 1,200 metres from the seabed, with secondary peaks reaching depths of 1,600 and 2,050 metres—ideal areas for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts. For years, marine geologists have quietly pointed to this undersea mountain range as a potential cobalt hotspot that could eclipse known reserves in the South Pacific.
And so when NOAA and NMOC experts arrive with their multi-beam sonar, oceanographic LIDAR, deep-sea acoustic imaging systems, and mineral-assessment algorithms, Colombo’s more observant policymakers ask an obvious question:
Is this sudden American interest really about shipping safety—or about cobalt?
US Ambassador Julie Chung has insisted, publicly and repeatedly, that the collaboration with Sri Lanka is about “capacity-building” and “strengthening maritime sovereignty.” She emphasised that knowing “what lies beneath” one’s waters is essential for protecting the country’s economic zone.
She is, of course, not wrong. But the timing raises eyebrows.
Sri Lanka's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) covers nearly 517,000 square kilometres, and the island lacks the advanced mapping capabilities needed for deep-sea mineral exploration. The United States, which has aggressively expanded its Indo-Pacific posture to counter China, now sees maritime Sri Lanka as a critical piece of strategic real estate—one that sits at the crossroads of global energy routes and potential cobalt treasure.
On 14 November, in a move that did not go unnoticed in New Delhi, Beijing, or London, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation at the Ministry of Defence. Ambassador Chung signed on behalf of Washington, joined by Brigadier General Trenton Gibson of the Montana National Guard. Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha (Retd) represented Sri Lanka.
The MoU reportedly covers training, joint exercises, disaster-response coordination, and, quietly, maritime intelligence exchange.
To the untrained eye, these seem ordinary components of bilateral defence cooperation. But for strategic analysts, they reveal a deeper alignment: Washington is positioning itself to understand, access, and potentially influence the mineral future of the northern Indian Ocean.
And here lies the irony. While Washington sends experts, satellites, ships, and technical delegations to Sri Lanka, the process for Sri Lankan nationals to visit the United States remains one of the most restrictive and humiliating in the region.
Visa appointment waiting times stretch from months to over a year. Sri Lankan applicants, including professionals, academics, and business owners, report curt interviews, opaque rejections, and arbitrary processing delays. Many speak of feeling treated as if they hail from a geopolitical afterthought rather than from a strategically indispensable island sitting near one of the world’s most coveted mineral basins.
This contrast has sparked criticism in Colombo’s diplomatic and academic circles.
“How can the United States ask for our seabed cooperation when it does not even treat our citizens with basic respect?” one senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked, off the record.
Another remarked: “Washington wants Sri Lankan cobalt, but won’t give Sri Lankan people a dignified visa process. That is not a partnership—it is transactional extraction.”
This has become an increasingly heated public debate:
Should Sri Lanka cooperate on mineral exploration before the US reforms the discriminatory visa treatment of Sri Lankan citizens?
To understand Washington’s cobalt calculus, one must appreciate the three interlinked drivers:
1. The US–China Competition
China has already mapped substantial parts of the Indian Ocean seabed through its oceanographic vessels Haiyang Dizhi and Xiang Yang Hong. Beijing’s deep-sea mining contractors have secured exploration rights in the Pacific from the International Seabed Authority (ISA).
If Sri Lanka partners with the US, it blocks China from obtaining strategic oceanographic access just south of India—a key American objective.
2. India’s Expanding Naval Footprint
India, now an Indo-Pacific heavyweight, views the Afanasy Nikitin zone as falling within its wider maritime security perimeter. Any US-Sri Lanka seabed collaboration must be balanced against India’s sensitivities, especially as New Delhi accelerates its own cobalt exploration in the Central Indian Ocean Basin.
3. Sri Lanka’s Economic Fragility
A financially distressed state with depleted foreign reserves is particularly vulnerable to mineral diplomacy. Cobalt exploration promises windfalls—if managed well. But without strong regulatory frameworks, the country risks becoming a passive resource frontier for a superpower.
While NOAA emphasises “scientific research,” analysts note several clear US interests:
Mapping cobalt-rich crust formations for future mineral extraction.
Understanding seabed topography for submarine operations.
Securing access to deep-sea zones before China does.
Positioning US contractors for future mining concessions.
Expanding defence cooperation under the façade of oceanographic support.
In the modern world, whoever controls undersea data often controls undersea resources.
Sri Lanka must navigate this opportunity with caution. Several questions remain unanswered:
• Who will own the geological data collected by the US teams?
Will Sri Lanka receive full, unrestricted rights to all mapped information?
• Will Washington expect exclusive mining rights?
If cobalt reserves are confirmed, will the United States push for preferential concessions?
• Are environmental risks being assessed?
Deep-sea mining remains controversial, with ecological costs still unknown.
• How will India and China react?
A tilt toward Washington could disrupt Colombo’s delicate balancing act in the Indian Ocean.
• Most importantly: will the United States adjust its treatment of Sri Lankan citizens?
A fairer visa system could go a long way toward demonstrating that the partnership is built on mutual respect, not resource extraction.
There is no denying that US scientific expertise can help Sri Lanka unlock a trillion-dollar mineral future. Cobalt, nickel, and rare-earth metals could transform the country’s economy if managed with transparency and national interest at the forefront.
But partnerships must be equitable. Sri Lanka cannot allow its seabed to become a geopolitical bargaining chip while its people face indignity at foreign embassies.
The United States must choose:
Does it want Sri Lanka merely for its minerals—or also as a respected partner?
Expert committees in Colombo are now examining the MOU and the implications of the NOAA–NMOC project. Environmentalists are calling for safeguards. Maritime strategists want clarity on data ownership. Diplomats want a reset on visa policy. And politicians want reassurances that Sri Lanka will not be treated as a two-tier partner in the Indo-Pacific architecture.
For now, US survey equipment is being unpacked in Colombo’s naval bases. Sri Lankan officers are being briefed. Hydrographic vessels are preparing for deep-sea missions.
And somewhere on the horizon, the cobalt-rich shadows of the Afanasy Nikitin Seamount loom—awaiting exploration, exploitation, or protection, depending on how Sri Lanka chooses to respond.
Washington may soon discover that mineral diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is not merely about what lies beneath the waves, but about the respect extended to the people who live above them.
-By LeN Geopolitical Correspondent
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by (2025-11-22 18:36:38)
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